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COMMENTS
Elements of Damages for Wrongful Death in Louisiana
This Comment is directed to a consideration of (a) the ele-
ments of damages recoverable for wrongful death in Louisiana,
(b) the factors considered by the court in determining the
amount of recovery, and (c) the devices used by the court to
control the amount of recovery. As the scope of this Comment
is limited to the damage aspect of wrongful death, there will be
no consideration of the cause of action other than a brief review
of its history.
EVOLUTION OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
The early common law did not recognize a civil cause of ac-
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tion for wrongful death and the only recourse against the wrong-
doer was a criminal action.' However, recovery for wrongful
injury was allowed.2 Thus it was more advantageous to the
wrongdoer if his injured victim died.a This anomalous situation
led to the passage of Lord Campbell's Act, which allows desig-
nated beneficiaries a right of action for the injury suffered by
them because of the victim's death.4 The primary requisite for
bringing the action is that the deceased would have had a
cause of action for his wrongfully inflicted injury. 5
Early Louisiana jurisprudence refused to grant a recovery
under Article 2315 of the Civil Code. 6 The leading case relied
on common law, in addition to old Roman and Spanish law, that
declared the life of a free man was insusceptible of evaluation.7
The court, in refusing to follow the French view that allowed
recovery under an identical article in the Code Napoleon, con-
cluded that it was for the legislature to provide a cause of ac-
tion.8 By a series of amendments to Article 2315 the legislature
added first a survival action,9 and a few years later a wrongful
death action.', As amended, Article 2315 grants a right of ac-
tion to certain beneficiaries, named in the order of preference
as (a) spouse and/or minor children; (b) major children; (c)
father and/or mother; and (d) blood brothers and/or sisters.
The vesting of the action in one group of beneficiaries prevents
the cause of action from ever vesting in any other group.
ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES
Article 2315 does not mention the damages to be allowed.
The court has interpreted this to mean that there are no restric-
tions on the elements of damages to be considered. 1 The major
1. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 24.1 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed.
1955).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Ibid.
4. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 VICT. c. 93 (1846).
5. Ibid. See PROSSER, TORTS § 105, at 710 (2d ed. 1955) : "Every American
state now has a statutory remedy for wrongful death. Most of the statutes were
modeled upon Lord Campbell's act."
6. Amburg v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 650 (1885);
Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881) ; McCubbin, Tutor v. Hastings,
27 La. Ann. 713 (1875) : Frank v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 20 La. Ann.
25 (1868) ; Earhart v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 17 La. Ann. 243 (1865)
Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851).
7. Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851).
8. Ibid.
.9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2294 (1825), as amended, La. Acts 1855, No. 223.
10. LA. CIwI CODE art. 2315 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1884, No. 71.
11. Bourdier v. Louisiana Western Ry., 133 La. 50, 52, 62 So. 348 (1913):
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elements of damage which the Louisiana courts have come to
recognize are as follows:12 (a) loss of support, (b) loss of so-
ciety, and (c) grief and anguish of the beneficiaries. It should
be noted that survival damages are frequently intermingled
with death damages.' 8
Loss of Support
Loss of support damages are recoverable upon proof that the
deceased had been contributing to the support of the plaintiff.
They are generally awarded without any explanation of how
they were determined. 4 Moreover, damages for loss of society
and for anguish are frequently lumped with loss of support
awards, making it more difficult to determine what the court
relied on in granting the award.' However, it seems clear that
the courts consider both the life expectancy and the earnings of
the deceased in determining what the loss of support may be.' 6
"The damages recoverable are neither defined nor restricted, and it is left to the
courts to determine both the motive and quantum of damages recoverable under
the statute."
12. Aymond v. Western Union Tel. Co., 151 La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922)
Downing v. Morgan's L. & T. Ry. & S.S. Co., 104 La. 508, 29 So. 207 (1900);
Randall v. Baton Rouge Bus Co., 114 So.2d 98 (La. App. 1959); Freeman v.
United States Cas. Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956) ; Todd v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 52 So.2d 880 (La. App. 1951); Buford v. Combs, 50 So.2d 489 (La.
App. 1951); DeHart v. State, 46 So.2d 366 (La. App. 1950); O'Connor v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 663 (La. App. 1949) ; Hebert v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 28 So.2d 151 (La. App. 1946); Cooper v. Garrett, 6 So.2d 209 (La. App.
1942) ; Holland v. Gross, 195 So. 840 (La. App. 1940) ; Clinton v. City of West
Monroe, 187 So. 561 (La. App. 1939) ; Maddox v. Pattison, 186 So. 894 (La.
App. 1939) ; Smith v. Monroe Grocer Co., 179 So. 495 (La. App. 1938) ; Boykin
v. Plauche, 168 So. 741 (La. App. 1936); Embry v. Reserve Natural Gas Co.,
124 So. 572 (La. App. 1929).
13. 1Hill v. Big Creek Lumber Co., 108 La. 152, 32 So. 372 (1902); Amburg
v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 650 (1885) ; Toney v. Pope,
110 So.2d 226 (La. App. 1959) ; Perot v. United States Cas. Co., 98 So.2d 584
(La. App. 1957) ; Payton v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 83 So.2d 575 (La. App.
1955) ; Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 14 So.2d 494 (La. App. 1943) ; Scott
v. Electric Co-op. Inc., 13 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1943) ; Pondexter v. Service Cab
Co., 161 So. 40 (La. App. 1935). See Andrus v. Louisiana Western Ry., 142
La. 318, 76 So. 727 (1917) (allowing survival damages for the mental pain of
deceased occasioned by his realization of the fatal nature of his injuries) ; Under-
wood v. Gulf Refining Co., 128 La. 968, 55 So. 641 (1911).
14. E.g., Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958); Stans-
bury v. Mayor of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d 445 (1955) ; Tolle v. Big-
gins Indus., Inc., 212 La. 173, 31 So.2d 730 (1947); Navarrette v. Joseph
Laughlin Inc., 209 La. 417, 24 So.2d 672 (1946).
15. See note 14 supra.
16, See, e.g., Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958)
Stansbury v. Mayor of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d 445 (1955) (the
court noticed that the deceased was 24 years old, and earned $57 a -week) ; Tolle
v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 212 La. 173, 31 So.2d 730 (1947) (deceased had a life
expectancy of 14 years and made about $12,000 a year) ; Navarrette v. Joseph
Laughlin Inc., 209 La. 417, 24 So.2d 672 (1946) ; Russo v. Texas & P. Ry., 189
La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (]938).
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In cases involving an award to the widow for loss of support,
the courts have recently evolved what may be termed the com-
munity property approach. This is based on the idea that the
widow has been deprived of her prospective share of the commu-
nity property.17 The formula utilized in this approach may be
stated as the annual net wage of the deceased times his life ex-
pectancy, divided by two, and discounted to its present value.18
The annual net wage is considered to be the deceased's previous
year's earnings, less any business expenses. 19 It should be noted
that the court in its discretion may disregard this new approach
and grant an amount for loss of support which it feels does sub-
stantial justice to the plaintiff.20 It would seem that when the
court grants an award merely on this basis, the widow may not
be fully compensated, since the actual loss is not determined.
The community property approach does attempt to ascertain the
widow's actual loss. 21 Furthermore, this approach takes into
consideration the property she may have lost by the dissolution
of the community, going beyond mere loss of support.22 While a
complete consideration of the merits of the community property
system for measuring the loss to the widow is beyond the scope
of this Comment, it does seem that a more uniform application
of this system would be desirable. The remarriage of the widow
prior to trial should be a factor in ascertaining the amount of
damages. The present view is that the remarriage does not miti-
gate any damages.23 It would probably be better to allow remar-
riage to mitigate loss of support damages, because the only loss
of support is sustained during the period between the death of
the former husband and the remarriage.2 4 Possibly this view
17. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 So.2d 594 (La. 1959) (reversed
as to state on other grounds); Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board,
110 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1959) (reversed on other grounds); Marler v. State,
78 So.2d 26 (La. App. 1955). See also Finn v. National Fire Ins. Co., 106
So.2d 815 (La. App. 1958).
18. Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 110 So.2d 156 (La. App.
1959). Present value is defined by the court in Fontenot v. National Transfer
Co., 99 So.2d 795, 810 (La. App. 1957) as "the sum of money which invested
at the rate of five percent per annum would produce with withdrawals from prin-
cipal over the 37 years an annual income of $5,680.00 per year." Here the deceased
had a life expectancy of 37 years and earnings for the previous year of $5,680.
19. Duree v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 So.2d 594 (La. 1959).
20. Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958) ; Fontenot v.
National Transfer Co., 99 So.2d 795 (La. App. 1957).
21. Duree v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 So.2d 594 (La. 1959).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 110 So.2d 156 (La. App.
1959). But see O'Connor v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 663 (La. App.
1949) (small recovery for love and affection when remarried at time of trial).
24. O'Connor v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 663 (La. App. 1949) (widow
remarried within the year and a half preceding trial; the court allowed her
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should be modified in the situation where the widow's present
husband earns less than her former husband, since she has been
damaged to the extent of this difference.
In determining the amount to be awarded for loss of support
to the minor children, the court has held that the loss includes
only that amount which the children could reasonably expect to
receive until majority.25 This award is the amount that the
judge feels is adequate under the circumstances, and is frequent-
ly lumped with the loss of society and anguish awards.26 Some-
times this award is distributed on the basis of the minor chil-
dren's ages.2 7 It is submitted that a definite means of ascertain..
ing the proper amount to compensate for this loss might be de-
rived, such as the actual amount of support and educational
funds that may be anticipated in view of the family's circum-
stances. Another aspect of awarding the children damages is
the extent to which they benefit from the mother's award.2
Where the community property approach is used to determine
the widow's damages, the children recover their entire award
from the deceased father's share of the community.29 It is sug-
gested that this permits a double recovery. Since both the father
and mother are obligated to support the children,30 the children's
support actually comes from the community. Therefore, one-half
of the children's award should be deducted from the mother's
award.
When a child who is contributing to the support of his par-
ents is killed, the parents may sue for that loss. 3 1 The award
$1500 for loss of support, noting that this was a proper amount because her
former husband's annual income was $1248).
25. Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R., Light & Power Co., 114 La. 712, 38 So.
526 (1905).
26. Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958); Guidry v.
Crowther, 96 So.2d 71 (La. App. 1957) ; Keith v. Royal Indemnity Co., 90
So.2d 534 (La. App. 1956). But see Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 So.2d
594 (La. 1959) (state held immune from liability, but affirmed as to other
defendant-child's loss of support awarded separately).
27. Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R., Light & Power Co., 114 La. 712, 38 So.
526 (1905) ; Kern v. Knight, 127 So. 133 (La. App. 1930). But see later cases:
Stansbury v. Mayor & Councilmen of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d 445
(1955) ; Toney v. Pope, 110 So.2d 226 (La. App. 1959) ; Rosier v. State, 50 So.2d
31 (La. App. 1951) ; DeHart v. State, 46 So.2d 366 (La. App. 1950) ; Alford v.
Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 38 So.2d 258 (La. App. 1949).
28. Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R., Light & Power Co., 114 La. 712, 38 So.
526 (1905).
29. See note 17 supra.
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 227 (1870): "Fathers and mothers, by the very act
of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and edu-
cating their children."
31. Watson v. McEacharn, 99 So.2d 138 (La. App. 1957) ; Bradford v. Wertz,
52 So.2d 47 (La. App. 1951) ; Salone v. Shreveport Ry., 41 So.2d 240 (La. App.
19601 361
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apparently is made in the discretion of the court as to amount
and is usually lumped with the awards made for loss of society
and for anguish.8 2 The probable continuance of the contribu-
tions is considered.33 Thus when the child contributing support
is shiftless and irregular in his contributions, 34 or is soon to be
married,8 5 the court has allowed small awards. It should be
noted that a minor's earnings may not be recovered, since the
parents are only entitled to the usufruct of them. 6
In cases where the brothers and sisters are plaintiffs, loss of
support may be proven as in any other case. 37 This is true even
though the law does not require collateral relatives to support
one another.8 The court will look to the contributions and life
expectancy of the deceased and grant an award that appears
just.8 9 The court has not yet evolved a specific criterion for ac-
curately determining loss of support damages due collateral rela-
tives.
It is suggested that in ascertaining the duration of loss of
support a more accurate determination might be reached by con-
sidering the life expectancies of both the plaintiff and the de-
ceased, and using the shorter, rather than just considering the
expectancy of the deceased.
Loss of Society, and Grief and Anguish of the Beneficiaries
Louisiana recognizes loss of society and the grief of the bene-
ficiaries as distinct elements of damage in wrongful death ac-
tions. 40 Loss of society is the deprivation of the companionship
1949) ; Gautreaux v. Landry, 37 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1948) ; Hebert v. Texas
& Pac. Ry., 28 So.2d 151 (La. App. 1946) ; Richie v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, 178
So. 752 (La. App. 1938).
32. See cases cited note 31 supra.
33. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 128 La. 319, 54 So. 865 (1911)
Brown v. Wertz, 52 So.2d 54 (La. App. 1951) ; Thibodaux v. Culotta, 192 So.
712 (La. App. 1939) ; Edwards v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 185 So. 111 (La. App.
1938) ; Williams v. Brown, 181 So. 679 (La. App. 1937).
34. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 128 La. 319, 54 So. 865 (1911).
35. Brown v. Wertz, 52 So.2d 54 (La. App. 1951) ; Thibodaux v. Culotta,
192 So. 712 (La. App. 1939). See also Williams v. Brown, 181 So. 679 (La.
App. 1937) (court said that since Negro daughter was 20 years old, it was not
to be presumed that she would have stayed at home much longer; rather it
was likely that she would soon marry).
36. Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 120 La. 1009, 45 So. 972 (1908).
37. Freeman v. United States Cas. Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956) ; Quaid
v. Heymann, 150 So. 867 (La. App. 1933) ; Langenstein v. Reynaud, 127 So.
764 (La. App. 1930).
38 Freeman v. United States Cas. Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956).
39. Ibid.; Quaid v. Heymann, 150 So. 867 (La. App. 1933).
40. Barber v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 141 La. 1059, 76 So. 199 (1917)
Engeron v. LeBlanc, 29 So.2d 497 (La. App. 1947).
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and love of the deceased; grief is that occasioned by the untimely
death and the loss of society. The acceptance of these losses as
elements of damage places Louisiana in the minority group of
states allowing such damages. 41 Since the relationship of grief
to loss of society is so close, the factors affecting both elements
may be considered together. The main factors usually considered
are the ages 42 and the closeness of the relationship existing be-
tween the plaintiff and deceased. 43 The court has recognized that
it is impossible actually to compensate for these losses 44 and that
there can be no standardization of awards made for these ele-
ments.
45
The closeness of the relationship between the deceased and
the plaintiff is a factor of utmost importance in determining the
amount of damages for grief and loss of society. In considering
the closeness which existed between spouses, the courts look to
the habits of the spouses,46 the apparent love and affection be-
tween them, and the marital harmony. 47 Thus where the hus-
41. Steele v. Miami Transit Co., 160 Fla. 362, 34 So.2d 530 (1948) (parents
may recover for anguish suffered because of death of minor child, by statutory
provision) Ginoza v. Takai Elec. Co., 40 Hawaii 691 (1955) (recovery for loss
of society) ; Cliecketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950) (recovery
for loss of society; but not for anguish) ; Duran v. Mission Mortuary, Inc., 174
Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241 (1953) (recovery for loss of society and for anguish);
Delta Chevrolet Co. v. Ward, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So.2d 443 (1951) (recovery for
loss of society) ; Nelson, Adm'r v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 231 S.C. 351,
98 S.E.2d 798 (1957) (damages include loss of society and anguish) ; Simons
v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950) (loss of society and anguish are
elements of damage) ; Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946)
(recovery includes loss of society) ; Matthews v. Hicks, Adm'r, 197 Va. 112, 87
S.E. 2d 629 (1955) (both loss of society and anguish are elements of damages) ;
Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 W.Va. 828, 169 S.E. 447 (1933) (recov-
ery for anguish); Muir, Adm'r v. Haggerty, Inc., 77 Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948
(1957) (loss of society recovered) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955) Annot.,
74 A.L.R. 11 (1931).
42. Churchill v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 151 La. 726, 92 So. 314 (1922) ; Bond v.
Spiller, 107 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958) ; Walker v. Jarnevick, 102 So.2d 770 (La.
App. 1958) ; Gautreaux v. Landry, 37 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1949).
43. Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) Moore
v. Nola Cabs, Inc., 70 So.2d 404 (La. App. 1954) ; Walker v. Chicago, R.I. &
P. Ity., 40 So.2d 668 (La. App. 1949).
44. Kent v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co., 154 La. 142, 97 So. 344 (1923) ; Bond v.
Spillers, 107 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958) ; Bodin v. Texas Co., 186 So. 390 (La.
App. 1939) ; Biagginin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 163 So. 780 (La. App.
1935) ; Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., 131 So. 709 (La. App. 1930).
45. Broussard v. Louisiana Western R.R., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916)
Bourdier v. Louisiana West. R.R., 133 La. 50, 62 So. 348 (1913) ; Dobyns v.
Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 119 La. 72, 43 So. 934 (1907) ; Biagginin v. Toye Bros.
Yellow Cab. Co., 163 So. 780 (La. App. 1935).
46. Eichorn v. New Orleans & C. R., Light & Power Co., 114 La. 712, 38
So. 526 (1905) : Ilehert v. Lake Charles Ice, Light & Water Works Co., 111
La. 522, 35 So. 731 (1903) ; Ryan v. Dendinger, Inc., 9 So.2d 849 (La.. App.
1942).
47. Bond v. Spillers, 107 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958) ; Fontenot v. National
Transfer Co., 99 So.2d 795 (La. App. 1957) ; Perot v. United States Cas. Co.,
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band was a drunkard and spent most of his time away from
home, 48 or lived in adultery with another, 49 the court considered
such evidence as indicating the relationship was not close and
awarded only small damages. However, where the husband was
a good provider, faithful and hard working,50 or the mother was
affectionate and ran a happy, contented household, 51 the court
concluded that there was a very close relationship, and allowed
substantial damages. Where the parents sue for a child's death,
the industry of the child around the home, 52 the time spent at
home, and the general companionship of the child and parents5"
tend to prove closeness of relationship. If the parents are separ-
ated, legally or otherwise, the parent with custody will recover
more than the other.54 When the child seeks recovery for the
loss of a parent, the guidance, moral counsel, love, affection and
aid rendered by the parent are indicative of the closeness.55 More
detailed proof of the closeness of relationship is apparently re-
quired by the court in suits for the death of a brother or sister.56
98 So.2d 584 (La. App. 1957) ; Marler v. State, 78 So.2d 26 (La. App. 1955).
See also Patrick v. T. Smith & Sons, Inc., 58 So.2d 353 (La. App. 1952).
48. Ross v. Tynes, 14 So.2d 80 (La. App. 1943) ; Rice v. Kansas City South-
ern Ry., 194 So. 444 (La. App. 1940) ; Shipp v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 188
So. 526 (La. App. 1939).
49. Poindexter v. Service Cab. Co., 161 So. 40 (La. App. 1935).
50. Patrick v. T. Smith & Sons, Inc., 58 So.2d 353 (La. App. 1952) ; Wright
v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 79 So.2d 894 (La. App. 1944) ; Scott v. Claiborne
Elec. Cooperative, 13 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1943) ; McNeil v. Boagni, 153 So. 352
(La. App. 1934).
51. Toney v. Pope, 110 So.2d 226 (La. App. 1959) ; LeBlanc v. Louisiana
Hwy. Commission, 5 So.2d 204 (La. App. 1941) ; Biagginin v. Toye Bros. Yellow
Cab Co., 163 So. 780 (La. App. 1935).
52. Watson v. McEacharn, 99 So.2d 138 (La. App. 1957) ; Himes v. Avinger,
85 So.2a 304 (La. App. 1956); Salone v. Shreveport Ry., 41 So.2d 240 (La.
App. 1949); Hebert v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 28 So.2d 151 (La. App. 1946).
53. Himes v. Avinger, 85 So.2d 304 (La. App. 1956) ; Gautreaux v. Landry,
37 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1949) ; Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1945)
(court saying that grief might be assuaged to some degree by the presence of
the plaintiffs' other children in the home) ; Bateman v. Louisiana Highway
Commission, 4 So.2d 507 (La. App. 1941); Smith v. Monroe Grocer Co., 179
So. 495 (La. App. 1938).
54. Joyner v. Williams, 35 So.2d 812 (La. App. 1948) ; Williams v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 11 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1942); Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So. 748
(La. App. 1936).
55. Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958) ; Keith v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 90 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1956) ; Rosier v. State, 50 So.2d 31
(La. App. 1951) ; LeBlanc v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 5 So.2d 204 (La.
App. 1941) ; Clinton v. City of West Monroe, 187 So. 561 (La. App. 1939). See
also Peart v. Orleans-Kenner Traction Co., 123 So. 822 (La. App. 1928) (deceased
father divorced and not supporting child-$9000 recovery).
56. Freeman v. United States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956)
(extensive consideration of factors determining closeness of the relationship);
Cox v. Gross, 47 So.2d 102 (La. App. 1950) ; Chustz v. Negrotto, 165 So. 479
(La. App. 1935) ; Quaid v. Heymann, 150 So. 867 (La. App. 1933). But see
Warrick v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 4 So.2d 607 (La. App. 1941) ; Pegg
v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 167 La. 896 (La. App. 1936) (very little discus-
sion of closeness of relationship).
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Factors utilized by the court include the difference in ages,
which tends to show companionship when the plaintiff and the
deceased have been living near each other,57 the degree of asso-
ciation between the parties, which is determined by the actual
visits made and the opportunities to visit,58 and the feeling of
the plaintiff for the deceased as indicated by correspondence,
gifts, and other expressions of affection.5
The early view of the court was that in actions for the death
of the very young and the very old the amount of recovery should
be less than the amount awarded for the death of those whose
age falls in between these extremes. 60 This notion was applied to
actions for the death of very young children because it was felt
that the parents were not as attached to such children.61 While
the court has never specifically rejected this view, it now appears
to make no such distinction.6 2 Where the plaintiff and deceased
were both elderly, the court apparently felt that they had little
time left on earth and consequently the duration of the loss was
not as great as if the parties had been younger.68 The court has
57. Freeman v. United States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956);
Cox v. Gross, 47 So.2d 102 (La. App. 1950) ; Chustz v. Negrotto, 165 So. 479
(La. App. 1936). G
58. Freeman v. United States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956)
Cox v. Gross, 47 So.2d 102 (La. App. 1950).
59. Cox v. Gross, 47 So.2d 102 (La. App. 1950).
60. Hebert v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co., 150 La. 957, 91 So. 406 (1922); Reed
v. Sievers, 146 La. 393, 83 So. 685 (1920) ; Schick v. Jenevein, 145 La. 333,
82 So. 360 (1919) ; Patton v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 142 La. 117, 76 So. 580
(1917) ; Robertson v. Town of Jennings, 128 La. 795, 55 So. 375 (1911) ; Sund-
maker v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 105 La. 111, 30 So. 285 (1901) ; Rice v. Crescent
City R.R., 51 La. Ann. 108, 24 So. 791 (1899) ; Moore v. Nola Cabs, Inc., 70
So.2d 404 (La. App. 1954) ; Dupuy v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 184 So. 736 (La.
App. 1938); Meaux v. Gulf Ins. Co., 182 So. 158 (La. App. 1938); Davidson
v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 175 So. 157 (La. App. 1937) ; Pizzitola v. Letel-
lier Transfer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1936) ; McNeil v. Boagni, 153 So. 352
(La. App. 1934) ; Santos v. Duvic, 133 So. 399 (La. App. 1931) ; Drago v. Dorsey,
125 So. 724 (La. App. 1930).
61. Hebert v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co., 150 La. 957, 91 So. 406 (1922) ; Patton
v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 142 La. 117, 76 So. 580 (1917); Robertson v.
Town of Jennings, 128 La. 795, 55 So. 375 (1911) ; Sundmaker v. Yazoo &
M.V. R.th, 106 La. 111, 30 So. 285 (1901) ; Rice v. Crescent City R.R., 51 La.
Ann. 108, 24 So. 791 (1899); Meaux v. Gulf Ins. Co., 182 So. 158 (La. App.
1938) (discussion of reasons for giving small amount) ; Drago v. Dorsey, 126
So. 724 (La. App. 1930). But see Embry v. Reserve Natural Gas Co., 124 So.
572 (La. App. 1929). For an interesting proposal on allowing damages for the
death of infants and elderly persons, see Comment, 4 N.W.U.L. Rev. 254 (1959).
62. Young child; Randall v. Baton Rouge Bus Co., 114 So.2d 98 (La. App.
1959) ($12,000 to each parent for each child's death; children 7 and 3 years old).
63. Reed v. Sievers, 146 La. 393, 83 So. 685 (1920) ; Schick v. Jenevein, 145
La. 333, 82 So. 360 (1919) ; Moore v. Nola Cabs Inc., 70 So.2d 404 (La. App.
1954); Dupuy v. Godchaux Sugars Inc., 184 So. 736 (La. App. 1938); David-
son v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 175 So. 157 (La. App. 1937) ; Pizzitola v.
Letellier Transfer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1936) ; McNeil v. Boagni, 153
So. 352 (La. App. 1934) ; Santos v. Duvic, 133 So. 399 (La. App. 1931) ; But see
Rose v. L'Engle, 148 La. 310, 86 So. 822 (1920).
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changed its view and now seems to recognize no distinction based
on the age of the plaintiff or the deceased. 64 This has resulted
from the adoption of the idea that the loss of society, and grief
and anguish, are present losses.6 8 In line with this, the court de-
termines the amount of damages on the basis of the relationship
existing between the plaintiff and deceased at the time of death,
rather than attempting to determine the loss on the basis of its
prospective duration. The difficulty presented under the early
view, which weighed the probable duration and intensity of the
loss in light of the ages of the plaintiff and deceased, is aptly
illustrated by two situations which confronted the court. In one,
the elderly plaintiff was allowed a smaller recovery than a
younger person would have been allowed because the loss of so-
ciety would be of short duration.6 In the other, the elderly plain-
tiff was considered entitled to more than a younger person be-
cause the longer time spent with the deceased indicated a greater
closeness, thus producing a loss of greater intensity. 7 It is sug-
gested that the view now entertained by the courts is sound,
since the pertinent evidence indicating the closeness of relation-
ship is fairly easy to obtain, insuring a reasonably accurate de-
termination of the actual closeness of relationship that had ex-
isted between the parties. This type of evidence gives the courts
an actual, rather than a speculative, basis upon which to predi-
cate their judgment.
Other Pecuniary Damages
Other pecuniary damages of lesser importance allowed by the
courts include such items as medical, 68 hospital,69 and funeral
expenses, 70 as well as loss of wages by the plaintiff.71 In order
64. Elderly persons: Bond v. Spillers, 107 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958) (deceased
husband 76/_, years old; amount to widow $17,932.10).
65. Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 106 So.2d 705 (1958) (see court
of appeal opinion in 101 So.2d 7 (La. App. 1958), classifying loss of society
an "immediate" damage as opposed to loss of support being a "prospective"
damage).
66. Pizzitola v. Letellier Transfer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1938).
67. Walker v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 668 (La. App. 1949).
•68. Johnson v. Industrial Lumber Co., 131 La. 897, 60 So. 608 (1912) ; Hagan
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 76 So.2d 36 (La. App. 1954); Mayer
v. Slaughter, 35 So.2d 166 (La. App. 1949) ; Pegg v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab
Co., 167 So. 896 (La. App. 1936) ; Constabel v. Miller, 131 So. 699 (La. App.
1931).
69. Hagan v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 76 So.2d 36 (La. App.
1954). See also Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 2 , 106 So.2d 705 (1958).
70. Randall v. Baton Rouge Bus Co., 114 So.2d 98 (La. App. 1959) ; Bond
v. Spillers, 107 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958) ; Finn v. National Fire Ins. Co., 106
So.2d 815 (La. App. 1958) ; Perot v. United States Casualty Co., 98 So.2d 584
(La. App. 1957).
71. Davis v. Surebest Bakery, Inc., 38 So.2d 624 (La. App. 1948).
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to recover these the plaintiff must prove actual damages sus-
tained.
METHODS OF CONTROL AVAILABLE TO THE COURT
Since the Louisiana courts may review both the facts and the
law on appeal and alter the judgment if they believe it necessary,
they have sometimes relied on judicial precedent, the cost of liv-
ing, and the ability of the defendant to pay as a justification for
their modification or affirmation of a judgment.7 2 These items
also appear to be considered at times by the trial judge in fixing
the amount of damages. It is suggested that such a use adds an
aura of greater fairness to the disposition of the case in which
they are used. By their use they become tools for controlling the
amount awarded.
Judicial Precedent
By the use of judicial precedent the court apparently seeks
to preserve uniformity of the amounts awarded in similar factual
situations. This is done by citing similar cases and the amount
granted in each case. 73 While this resulting uniformity tends to
indicate the impartiality of the law, it seems that a decision at
least as fair could be reached based upon the factual situation of
each case without the use of precedent.
Cost of Living
When granting awards 74 the court has constantly taken judi-
cial notice of the change in the purchasing power of the dollar.
72. See notes 73-78 infra.
73. Stansbury v. Mayor of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d 475 (1955)
Tolle v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 212 La. 173, 31 So.2d 730 (1947) ; Randall v.
Baton Rouge Bus Co., 114 So. 98 (La. App. 1959) ; Bond v. Spillers, 107
So.2d 706 (La. App. 1958); Watson v. McEacharn, 99 So.2d 138 (La. App.
1957) ; St. Julian v. State, 98 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1957) ; DeHart v. State,
46 So.2d 366 (La. App. 1950) ; Davis v. Surebest Bakery, Inc., 38 So.2d 624
(La. App. 1948); Paquet v. Renken, 30 So.2d 218 (La. App. 1947) ; Hebert
v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 28 So.2d 151 (La. App. 1946); Levy v. New Orleans &
Northeastern R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); Barnes v. Red River &
G.R.R., 128 So. 724 (La. App. 1930) ; Johnson v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.,
5 La. App. 649 (1927) (citing 27 cases with the amount awarded to support
verdict). See also Walker v. Jarnevich, 102 So.2d 770 (La. App. 1958).
74. Perot v. United States Casualty Co., 98 So.2d 584 (La. App. 1957)
Freeman v. United States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956); Himes
v. Avinger, 85 So.2d 304 (La. App. 1956) ; Bergeron v. Saia, 37 So.2d 866 (La.
App. 1948) ; Gautreaux v. Landry, 37 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1949) ; Short v. Cen-
tral La. Elee. Co., 36 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1948); Levy v. New Orleans &
Northeastern R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); Scott v. Claiborne Elec.
Coop., Inc., 13 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1943); Donaldson v. Riddling's Suce., 145
So. 804 (La. App. 1933).
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This purports to give about the same value of damages to plain-
tiffs in similar situations which arise in different years.7 5 Used
in conjunction with precedent this application appears equitable,
though, if precedent were to be discarded, unnecessary.
Ability of the Defendant To Pay
The ability of the defendant to pay is generally used by the
court to restrict or reduce the amount of damages.7 6 When the
defendant has little means or income, and little or no insurance,
the court will grant damages in an amount substantially lower
than if the defendant had more money.Y7 To be consistent, in
considering the ability of the defendant to pay, the court would
have to allow a greater amount of damages when the defendant
is a wealthy person. Apparently this is not done. When this
ability to pay is considered, the plaintiff is compensated only
insofar as the amount awarded does not impose a great hardship
upon the defendant. In the light of the Louisiana principle that
only compensatory damages are awarded, 78 it would seem that
the courts should not consider the ability of the defendant to pay
in any case.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana courts have been realistic in recognizing the
elements of loss sustained by the beneficiaries on account of the
deceased's wrongful death. However, the criteria by which the
elements are measured generally appear to permit only rough
approximations. It is suggested that each element of damage
that is susceptible of definite calculation should be subjected to
a criterion that accurately measures that loss. As indicated by
75. See Levy v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App.
1945).
76. Robideaux v. Hebert, 118 La. 1089, 43 So. 887 (1907) ; Vail v. Spam-
pinato, 108 So.2d 262 (La. App. 1958) (cert. granted) ; Freeman v. United
States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1956) ; Bergeron v. Saia, 37 So.2d
866 (La. App. 1948); Wright v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 19 So.2d 894 (La. App.
1944); Killian v. Modern Iron Works, Inc., 15 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1943);
Seither v. Poter, 194 So. 467 (La. App. 1940); Donaldson v. Riddling's Succ.,
145 So. 804 (La. App. 1933).
77. Bergeron v. Saia, 37 So.2d 866 (La. App. 1948) ; Wright v. Texas &
N.O. R.R., 19 So.2d 894 (La. App. 1944).
78. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541
(1917) ; Underwood v. Gulf Refining Co., 128 La. 968, 55 So. 641 (1911);
Robertson v. Town of Jennings, 128 La. 795, 55 So. 375 (1911); Cherry v.
Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 121 La. 471, 46 So. 596 (1908) ; LeBlanc v. Sweet, 107
La. 355, 31 So. 766 (1901). See also Loeblich v. Garnier, 113 So.2d 95 (La.
App. 1959) (although dealing primarily with damages for trespass to property,
the case contains an interesting explanation of Louisiana's treatment of mental
sufffering damages as being compensatory rather than punitive).
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the community property approach to determine the widow's loss,
the courts have already begun to evolve such criteria. A further
extension of the establishment of definite criteria to measure
the loss of different plaintiffs will probably result in more
awards that actually compensate for the damage sustained. :
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.
Problems of the Retained Employee in Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law
INTRODUCTION
The problems created by the retention of an injured employee
are some of the most confusing in Workmen's Compensation
Law. A retained employee is one who has suffered a disability
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Statute, but
has been retained by the employer to do such work as he is
still able to perform.' Retention of the injured employee is
thought to be socially desirable since rehabilitation often results
from the continued employment. 2 However, several problems
arise when the injured employee resigns, is dismissed, or seeks
to have his compensation fixed when he is receiving wages.
These problems generally are as follows: (1) whether to allow
the employer credit for wages paid after the injury; (2) whether
an action by the employee to have his compensation fixed,
brought during the retention period, is premature; (3) whether
prescription has accrued against the claim. Since the issues of
wage credit, prematurity, and prescription are closely related,
the courts have attempted to achieve consistency within the
various rules to be applied to each individually. The result has
been confusion because it is impossible to maintain consistency
and at the same time reach a desirable solution to the retained
employees problem. For instance, it seems desirable for an em-
ployee to be able to bring suit to have his compensation claim
set even while he is receiving wages. At the same time it ap-
pears undesirable to force him to go to court by having pre-
scription run on his claim. It also seems desirable to give an
employer credit for wages paid to the employee on a subsequent
1. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§401 (1951).
2. Ibid.
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